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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Assessment of the Instrumentation Subsystem FMEA/CIL
1.0 EXECUTXVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206.
_nst_uctions for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. I0 October 1986,
with changes i, 2, 3, and 4.
The IOA effort first completed an analysis of the Instrumentation
hardware, generating draft failure modes and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. The IOA results were then compared to
the NASA FMEA/CIL baseline. A resolution of each discrepancy
from the comparison is provided through additional analysis as
required. This report documents the results of that comparison
for the Orbiter Instrumentation hardware.
The IOA product for Instrumentation analysis consisted of one
hundred-seven failure mode "worksheets" that resulted in twenty-
two critical items being identified. Comparison was made to the
pre-51L NASA baseline with fourteen Post-51L FMEAs added, which
consists of ninety-six FMEAs and eighteen CIL items. The
comparison dete_ined if there were any results which had been
found by IOA but were not in the NASAbaseline. This comparison
produced agreement on all but twenty-five FMEAs which caused
differences in fiveiigIL items. Reference Figure i.
The issues arose due to differences between the NASA and IOA
FMEA/CIL preparation instructions. NASA had used an older ground
rules document which has since been Superseded by the NSTS 22206
used by the IOA. After comparison, there were no discrepancies
found that were not already identified by NASA, and the remaining
issues may be attributed to differences in ground rules.
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Figure 1 - INSTRUMENTATION ASSESSMENT OVERVIEW
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Figure 2a - ZNSTR_TATZON SUBSYSTEM OVERVIEW
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Figure 2b - OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
DETAILED SYSTEM REPRESENTATION OVERVIEW
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Figure 2c - MADS DETAIL SYSTEM REPRESENTATION OVERVIEW
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and ratlonale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS)_ The NSTS office
has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the
Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as'built drawings to breakdown the-respectlve-subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
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Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Instrumentation Ground Rules and Assumptions
The Instrumentation ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA
are defined in Appendix B.
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3.0 BUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The subsystem consists of the hardware required for data
acquisition, conditioning, timing, f0_a££ing, and routing for
checkout and display as needed, and for recording or downlinking
by telemetry as required.
3.1.1 Operational Instrumentation
. Sensors and transducers acquire data representing
measurements or status of individual parameters
throughout the vehicle and convert quantities sensed to
electrical signals.
• Signal conditioners normalize or standardize the sensor
outputs either to range for analog measurements or to
set levels for discretes (ON/OFF, HIGH/LOW). There are
13 Dedicated Signal Conditioners (DCSs) handling
approximately 1200 individual measurement channels.
• Reference junctions provide a reference potential for a
known temperature for thermocouple sensors.
. The seven OI Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs) format
incoming data from signal conditioners and feed it into
the OI data buses, which in turn route the formatted
data to the active PCMMU.
• The active Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit accepts
incoming data from the OI MDMs, combines that data with
GPC downlist data and payload data (if any) from the
PDI. The PCMMU formats the data into a serial bit
stream and routes it to the communications subsystem
for further processing/routing. (A "cold standby"
PCMMU is available as a backup.)
• The Master Timing Unit (MTU) is a very stable and
accurate source of timing for Orbiter and payload
operations. It provides time in IRIG B GMT and IRIG B
MET formats, and also provides synchronizing/timing
signals for many Orbiter LRUs.
. The Orbi£er Timing Buffer (OTB) amplifies and splits
one IRIG B GMT signal and one IRIG B MET signal to
produce eight GMT and four MET outputs for use by the
Orbiter.
• The Payload Timing Buffer (PTB) performs the same
functions as the OTB, but for payload users•
1
1
D
I
I
1
I
1
u
I
1
l
1
w
8
I
1
ww
J
Li J
U
w
w
w
=--
w
• Two operational tape recorders are used to alternately
record and dump OI data and voice. They are identical
14-track wideband units capable of recording analog or
digital data and voice.
10. The Payload Recorder (PLR) is identical to the two OPS
recorders, and is used to record payload data.
3.1.2
io
Modular Auxiliary Data System
Sensors and transducers perform the same function for
MADS as for OI.
• Strain Gage Signal Conditioners (SGSCs) accept the
outputs of completion bridges and condition the
signals for handover to the MADS PCM MUX.
• The PCMU accepts the outputs from the SGSCs and
multiplexes, encodes, and formats the data for output
to the T-O umbilical or to the MADS Control Module
(MCM) for further routing to the MADS recorder.
• Wideband Signal Conditioners (WBSCs) handle high-
frequency signals and with wide variations in output
amplitude, such as from transducers sensing vibratory,
acoustic, and POGO phenomena•
•
outputs.
The Frequency Division Multiplexer (FDM) accepts WBSC
Each individual channel measurement signal
modulates a voltage-controlled oscillator (VCO)
subcarrier signal. The individual modulated VCO
subcarriers are summed and the composite FDM output is
passed to the MADS Control Module (MCM) for eventual
routing to the MADS recorder•
• The MCM controls power to the various MADS LRUs and
selects recorder speeds, modes, tape direction, tape
tracks, and PCM Mux formats and data rates.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The Instrumentation hardware is located through the Orbiter. The
precise location for each component is shown in Table A.
m
w
3.3 Hiezazchy
Figures 2a, 2b, and 2c, illustrate the hierarchy of the
instrumentation subsystem. Figures 3 - i0 are detailed system
diagrams for specific references.
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OI
OI ¢qS'FALLED OI INSTALLED
NOIVENCLATU RE LOCATION NOMENCLATURE LOCATION
1B
DSCs
OF1 AV BAY 1
OF2 AV BAY 2
IOF3 i AV BAY 3
OF4 , F'WD RCS MODULE
I
OA1 i AV BAY 4
OA2 i AV BAY 5
OA3 i AV BAY 6
I
OM1 i IV_ FUSELAGE
OM2 i MID FUSELAGE
IO!.1 i LEFT OMS POD
OL2 , LEFT OMS POD
i
OR1 i RIGHT OMS POD
OR2 i RIGHT OMS POD
......................... _,t ......................... L.
OF1 i AVBAY 1
OF2 _ AV BAY 2
I
, OF3 ; AV BAY 3
OF4 _ FLTDECK
' OA1 I AV BAY 4
OA2 , AVBAY 5
OA3 i AVBAY 6
I
MDMs
!
PDI , AV BAY 1
!
I
i
PCMMUs 1 ' AvBAY 1
2 !I AV BAY 2
I
MTU _ AV BAY 3Bi
I
!
!
OPSI , AVBAY 2
RCDRs oPs 2 'i AV BAY 2
' P/L ' AV BAY 1i
I
1
I I
I
OrB- , BIB-_D PANEL L16
FFB ', BEHND PANEL L16
I
I
I
BIB
1
m
1
lib
lib
I
1
MADS
MADS INSTALLED
NOMB4CLATURE LOCATION
WBSC MID BODY
8GSC MID BODY
PCMU MID BODY
FDM MID BODY
....................... i..........................
POA MID BODY
MCM CABIN MIDDECK
RCDR CAB_ MIDDECK
1
i
i
mB
i
i
1
1
TABLE A - INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT LOCATION
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Figure 3 - MASTER TIMING UNIT
DETAIL SYSTEM REPRESENTATION
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Figure 4 - PCMMU DETAILED REPRESENTATION
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Figure 5 - OI MDM DETAILED REPRESENTATION
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Figure 7 - PDI DETAILED REPRESENTATION
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Figure 8 - S_R DETAILED REPRESENTATION
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Figure 9 - OI FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM
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Figure i0 - MADS FUNCTIONAL BLOCK DIAGRAM
18
m
l
ii
4.0 ASSESSMENT RESULTS
The IOA analysis of the Instrumentation hardware initially
generated eighty-eight failure mode worksheets and identified eight
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) before starting the assessment
process. These analysis results were compared to a NASA
baseline which was frozen as of 1 January 1988, with fourteen
post 51L FMEAs included in a total of ninety-six FMEAs and
eighteenCIL items, which were generated using the referenced
FMEA/CIL instructions. Upon completion of the assessment,
eighty-two of the one-hundred-seven FMEAs were in agreement.
Of the twenty-five that remained, four are 2/2 criticality and
not currently on the NASA CIL list, one CIL is assigned a
different criticality and seven new FMEAs were generated which
had no NASA match. The remaining fourteen FMEAs are of a
different criticality than the NASA interpretation. None of
these fourteen FMEAs affect the CIL listing.
A summary of the quantity of NASA FMEAs assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified are presented
in Table I.
I Table I
i Component
MTU
PCMMU
MDM
DSC
PDI
OPS REC
P/L REC
OTB
PTB
MADS
SENSORS
TOTAL
SUMMARY OF IOA FMEA ASSESSMENT
NASA
.u_nm_m_mmm,
4
II
9
I0
4
9
7
3
5
18
16
96
IOA
4
Ii
14
15
4
9
7
3
5
19
16
107
Issues
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A summary of the quantity of NASA CIL items assessed, versus the
recommended IOA baseline, and any issues identified are presented
in Table II.
I Table II SUMMARY OF IOA CIL ASSESSMENT I
4
I Component
_.i_emlmmm
MTU
PCMMU
MDM
DSC
PDI
OPS REC
P/L REC
OTB
PTB
MADS
SENSORS
TOTAL
NASA Issues I
E
4
i
m
J
w
m
IOA
3 3
7 7
5 9
3 3
18 22
Appendix C presents the detailed assessment worksheets for each
failure mode identified and assessed. Appendix D highlights the
NASA Critical Items and corresponding IOA worksheet ID. Appendix
E contains IOA analysis worksheets supplementing previous
analysis results reported in Space Transportation System
Engineering and Operations Support (STSEOS) Working Paper No.
1.0-WP-VA86001-017, Analysis of the Instrumentation, 19 December
1986. Appendix F provides a cross reference between the NASA
FMEA and corresponding IOA worksheet(s). IOA recommendations
are also summarized.
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nTable III presents a summary of the IOA recommended failure
criticalities for tee Post 51-L FMEA baseiine. Further
discussion of each of these subdivisions and the applicable
failure modes is provided in subsequent paragraphs.
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4
SUMMARY OF IOA RECOMMENDED FAILURE CRITICALITIES
Cri_ality: I I/i
PCMMU
MDM _ -
DSC _ -
PDI !- _
OPS
P/L
OTB
PTB
MADS
SENSOR
2/IR
m
2
w
w
+
q 2
2/2
3
4
5
w
12
3/IR
3
4
7
3/2R
1
3
4
6
4
5
23TOTAL
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4
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2
3
5
19
16
63
TOTAL
4
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14
15
4
9
7
3
5
19
16
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Of the failurt
critical items
is presented i_
I Table IV
4
SU_.
Criticality:
MTU
PCMMU
MDM
DSC
PDI
OPS REC
P/L REC
OTB
PTB
MADS
SENSORS
TOTAL
lyzed, twenty-two were determined to be
rY-of the IOA recommended critical items
RECOMMENDED CRITICAL ITEMS
R 2/2
3
4
5
w
w
3/IR
2
u
w
2
3/2R
3
3
6
3/3 TOTAL
3
7
9
3
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w
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The scheme for assigning IOA assessment (Appendix C) and analysis
(Appendix E) worksheet numbers is shown in Table V.
I
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I Component
+
MTU
PCMMU
MDM
DSC
PDI
Ops Rec
P/L Rec
OTP
PTB
MADS
Sensors
Table V IOA WORKSHEET NUMBERS
IOA ID Number
.--m_m m
131-134
121-128, 231-233
112-118
i01-iii, 302-305
161-164
171-177
181-186
151-153
141-144, 154
201-214, 221-222, 241-256
218, 261-301
4.1 MTU Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced four FMEAs, three of which were given
a 2/2 criticality as CILs.
4.2 PCMMU Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced eleven FMEAs, four of which were
given 2/2 criticality and three given 3/2R criticality as CILs.
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4.3 MDM Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced fourteen FMEAs, of which two were
given 2/1R, five 2/2, and two 3/1R criticality as CILs. One of
the IOA 2/IR CILs was an issue with the NASA 2/2 criticality.
4.4 DSC Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced fifteen FMEAs, of which none were
given CIL status.
4.5 PDI Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced four FMEAs, of which three were
given 3/2R criticality as CILs.
4.6 Operations Recorder Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced nine FMEAs, none of which were of CIL
criticality.
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4.7 Payload Recorder Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced seven FMEAs, none of which were of CIL
criticality.
4.8 OTB Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced three FMEAs, none of which were of CIL
criticality.
4.9 PTB Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced five FMEAs, none of which were of CIL
criticality.
4.10 MADS Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced nineteen FMEAs, none of which were of
CIL criticality.
4.11 Sensors Assessment Results
The IOA assessment produced sixteen FMEAs, none of which were of
CIL criticality.
m
= .
w
m
w
=
n
u
23
5.0 REFERENCES
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used included the following:
i. JSC-II174, Space Shuttle Systems Handbook, Rev. C,
9-12-85
2. JSC-18611, INCO/COMM Systems Brief, Rev. C, PCN-3,
8-15-83
3. Shuttle Flight Operations Manual Volume 4E -
Instrumentation, 7-85
4. JSC-12820, STS Operational Flight Rules, PCN-1, 2-14-86
5. NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), 10-10-86
6. Schematic VS70-974099 (OI)
7. Schematic VS72-978099, EO AI4 (MADS)
8. Schematic VS72-978102 (MADS)
9. Schematic VS72-941102 (FASCOS)
10. Main Engine ICD 13M 15000 (FASCOS)
Ii. NSTS 08171, Operations and Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document (OMRSD), 10-15-86
12. TD203, Communications/Instrument Workbook COM/IN2102,
2-85 (Crew Training Workbook)
13. MC476-0130, Specification, Master Unit, Pulse Code
Modulation, Rev. D, 4-30-82
I
r
I
i
mm
mm
m
g
I
mm
I
I
l
D
I
m
24
I
uAPPENDIX is,
ACRONYM8
u
i
= =
r..-
L_J
W
I
=
r--
W
m
L
U
F_
m
ACIP
AOA
ARPCS
AV
BFS
Calibr
CCTV
CIL
CRIT
DFI
DFL
Dk
DOD
DSC
EIU
Ena
ET
F
FASCOS
FDM
Flt
FMEA
Fwd
GMT
GPC
GSE
IFM
INCO/COMM
INST
IOA
ips
IRIG B
LRU
MADS
Man
MCM
MDAC
MDM
MET
MIA
MTU
MUX
NA
NASA
NSP
OA
OF
Aerodynamics Coefficient Instrumentation Package
Abort Once Around
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
Avionics
Backup Flight System
Calibration
Closed Circuit Television
Critical Items List
Criticality
Development Flight Instrumentation
Decommutator Format Load
Deck
Department of Defense
Dedicated Signal Conditioner
Engine Interface Unit
Enable ....
External Tank
Functional
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Frequency Division Multiplexer
Flight
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Forward
Greenwich Meridien Time
General Purpose Computer
Ground SupportEquipment
In-Flight Maintenance
Instrumentation and Communication Officer -
Communications
Instrumentation
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Inches per second
Interrange*_Instrumentation Group B-format
Line Replacement Unit
Modular Auxiliary Data System
Manual
MADS Control Module
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Mission Elapsed Time
Multiplexer Interface Adapter
Master Timing Unit
Multiplex
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Network Signal Processor (Communications Subsystem)
Operational Aft
Operational Forward
A-I
w
Ol
OMRSD
OMS
OPS
OTB
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PCMU
PDA
PDI
PL, P/L
Pnl
POGO
PTB
PWR
QC
RTLS
SFOM
SGSC
SM
SPF
SRB
SSSH
STR
STS
SW
SYS
T-O
TAL
TFL
TPS
VCO
WBSC
ACRONYMS
Operational Instrumentation
Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Operations, Operational
Orbiter Timing Buffer
Potential Critical Item
Pulse Code Modulation
PCM Master Unit (OI)
PCM Multiplexer Unit (MADS)
Power Distribution Assembly
Payload Data Interleaver
Payload
Panel
Acceleration/Vibration Along Thrust Axis
Payload Timing Buffer
Power
Quality Control
Return to Launch Site
Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
Strain Gage Signal Conditioner
Systems Management
Single Point of Failure
Solid RocketBooster
Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
Shuttle Tape Recorder
Space Transportation System .......
switch
System
Time Zero
Trans-Atlantic Abort Landing
Telemetry Format Load
Thermal Protection System
Voltage-Controlled Oscillator
Wideband Signal Conditioner
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions For Preparation
qf FMEA/C_L, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
_OR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(oPs)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
_FF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
_HASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count'down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
_ LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE = begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transi£ion-out Of oPs 1 (Synonymouswith ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/$A_NG PHASE- begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206. Instructions for
p_reparation of FMEA/CIL. I0 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
Io
•
•
•
5_
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item=.
RATIONALE: Analysls of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
i
mm
m
g
I
m
B
l
U
i
g
I
B
R
mm
l
B-4
I
B
mm
i
u
=_
i
m
mgw
m
i
L
w
.
•
0
.
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection•
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics•
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project•
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
I
B.3 Instrumentation Subsystem - Specific Ground Rules and
Assumptions
i• Sensors and transducers and associated individual or
integral signal conditioners used within a subsystem will be
analyzed by specialists assessing that subsystem.
Rationale: The subsystem analyst is the person best
qualified to identify credible failure
modes/causes and to assess the effects/
criticalities of those failures.
2. Human error (e.g., misconfiguration by crew or ground) will
not be considered.
•
Rationale: Possible misconfigurations are out of scope
for this analysis.
Inadvertent misconfigurations (e.g., accidental body contact
by crew member with a switch in zero-g operations) will not
be considered.
Rationale: Most critical switches have guards, or are
lever-lock type. Possible inadvertent
misconfigurations are out of scope for this
analysis•
4. Hardware items have been properly qualified, have passed
applicable acceptance testing, and have been properly
installed in the Orbiter. Exception: if analysis of
LRU/subassembly/piece-part failure history discloses
multiple failures for a particular item, that item will be
individually examined for design/QC deficiencies, and will
be flagged for special attention.
Rationale: Baseline assumption is that program
controls have resulted in hardware that is
properly qualified and installed.
5. The criticality of an Instrumentation SS hardware item will
be assigned on the basis of the highest criticality of any
parameter or measurement traversing it.
Rationale: Instrumentation exists as a service to
other subsystems and to give insight into
their status; the criticality of any
path(s) within it is determined by the
criticality of measurements utilizing it.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ASSESSMENT
This section contains the IOA assessment worksheets generated
during the assessment of this subsystem. The information on
these worksheets facilitates the comparison of the NASA FMEA/CIL
(Pre and Post 51-L) to the IOA detailed analysis worksheets
included in Appendix E. Each of these worksheets identifies the
NASA FMEA being assessed, corresponding MDAC Analysis Worksheet
ID (Appendix E), hardware item, criticality, redundancy screens,
and recommendations. For each failure mode, the highest assessed
hardware and functional criticality is compared and discrepancies
noted as "N" in the compare row under the column where the
discrepancy occurred.
LEGEND FOR IOA ASSESSMENT WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 _ Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR _ Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission
Redundancy Screens A, B and C:
P _ Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
NASA Data :
Baseline
New
- NASA FMEA/CIL
- Baseline with Proposed Post 51-L Changes
CIL Item :
X = Included in CIL
Compare Row :
N = Non compare for that column (deviation)
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-101
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220200-1
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: i01
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
DSC OF4, OM2, OLI/2, OR1/2
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3
IOA [ 3 /3
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMP_Z C / ] C " 3 [ N ] [ " ]
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS IMPROPERLY APPLIED IN IOA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-102
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM".
INSTRUMENTATION
102
DSC OF1, OF2, OF3
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 12R ]" [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADDIDEI]ETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA COUNTERPART. ERRONEOUS DATA COULD CAUSE MISSION
ABORT.
w
wmm
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-103
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220200-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
103
DSC OF1, OF2, OF3
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
IN] [N]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[ ]
[P]
[N]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
I
l
B
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
CORRESPONDS TO NASA GENERIC FMEA. NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-104
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
104
DSC OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO NASA COUNTERPART FMEA IN PRE-51L BASELINE. THESE DSC's HANDLE
CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT COULD PROMPT
UNNECESSARY MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU, _QUIRING ABORT. FAILS
SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED DSC CHANNEL COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-5
D
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-I05
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
105
DSC OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[P] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
m
I
ms
l
m
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
_ INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
NO NASA COUNTERPART FMEA IN PRE-51L BASELINE. THESE DSC's HANDLE
CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT COULD PROMPT
UNNECESSARY MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU, REQUIRING ABORT. FAILS
SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED DSC CHANNEL COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-106
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220204-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
106
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
C ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2 R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. CRITICAL ARPCS
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSCs OF1 AND OF4. LOSS OF FUNCTION
AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM
MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-7
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-106
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220200-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
106
DSC 0F4, OM2, OLI/2, OR1/2
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
.C / ] [ ] [- ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
m
I
i
g
m
m
m
m
m
m
ram.
"m
m
m
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-8
mR
mm
m
iw
i
_=
u
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-107
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220206-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
107
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
[ NA] [ NA] [ NA] [
[P] [P] [P] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA EVALUATION. ARPCS CRITICAL
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSCs OF2 AND OF3. LOSS OF FUNCTION
AFTER SECOND _FAIL_ cO_ULD AF?ECT MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM
MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
m
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-108
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220201-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
108
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT DSC OAI, 2, 3 (3)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
C P ] C P ]
CP] [P]
C ] [ ]
c
[p]
[p]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. CRITICAL APU
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSCs OAI, OA2_D OA3. LOSS OF
FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF
SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
SEE RELATED IOA 104.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-109
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220205-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
109
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ NA] [ NA] [ NA]
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR-] [ P ] '[ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS*.
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. CRITICAL APU
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSC OMI. LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER
SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF SUBSYSTEM
MEASUREMENTS WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-II
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II0
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220203-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
ii0
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT DSC OR1 AND 2 (3)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
I
U
mm
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mm
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-111
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
iii
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, DSC-OLI & 2 (3)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ /
C ] C ] C ] C ] *
C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] C ] [ ] C ] C ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-II2
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
112
MDM OF1, OF2
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
A B C
[ ] [ ] C ] [ ] *
CP] [P] [P] [ ]
IN] IN] IN] [ ]
I
Q
i
I
I
U
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[ 3 /2R ]
(If different from NASA)
[P] [p] [P] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO NASA FMEA COUNTERPART.
HANDLED BY THESE MDM's.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WO_HEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-II3
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
113
MDM OF4, OAI, OA2, OA3
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ]. [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
_ _ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA _A ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR BECAUSE INITIAL MDM FAILURE PLUS A
SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF A FUEL CELL HEATER RELAY OR APU FUEL LINE
HEATER RELAY IMPROPERLY LEAVING HEATER ON COULD CAUSE UNDETECTED
CONDITION RESULTING IN POSSIBLE EXPLOSION. AGREE WITH
NASA _A.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-II4
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-6-1
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 114
ITEM: MDM OF3
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[P] [ ]*
[ P ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] C ] C ]
L.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II5
NASA FME #: 05-6R-221502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
115
CIRCUIT BREAKER 7.5 A
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
L
r
w
F
U
w
w
L=
w
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-17
u
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-!!5
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
115
MDM OAI, OA2, OA3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ ]
E
m
m
m
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ F ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS FAIL TO SCREEN B BECAUSE SOURCE OF ERRONEOUS
OUTPUT CANNOT BE IDENTIFIED. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II6
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221503-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
116
CIRCUIT BREAKER 7.5A (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
- ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
_=
. J
m
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II7
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM: EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 117
ITEM: POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM OAI, 2, 3,
CRITICALITY 3 COMPONENTS
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P] [
[ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS :
[3 /IR ]
(If different from NASA)
C P] C F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
DISAGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY ASSIG_NT BECAUSE LOSS OF
ALL INSIGHT INTO CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS HANDLED BY MDMs OA1,
OA2, OA3 COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. FAILS SCREEN B
BECAUSE ONE OF THE REDUNDANT RPC OUTPUTS FOR AN MDM COULD
BE LOST WITH NO INDICATION TO CREW OR GROUND.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-II8
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221504-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
118
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2T
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
CRITICAL APU AND FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS ARE HANDLED BY THE
AFFECTED MDM's, AND THEIR LOSSCOULD THREATEN C_W/VEHICLE
SAFETY, BECAUSE CRITICAL CONDITiONS/FAILURES COULD BE MASKED.
RECO_ND UPGRADING TO 2/IR. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE THERE WOULD
BE
NO INSIGHT INTO THOSE MASKED CONDITIONS DURING FLIGHT.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-121
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW[X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
121
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA BECAUSE ONE UNIT IS IN INACT!_ STANDBY.
NASA FMEA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR BECAU_SS QF BQ_ P_,s COULD
CAUSE LOSS OFFAU-LTDETE_iONPARAMETE_T_T COULD AFFECT
CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY. AGREE WITH NASA CRIT. NOTE: PRESENT
FLIGHT RULES CALL FOR MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT ON LOSS OF FIRST_
PCMMU.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-122
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
122
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ N ] [ ] [ N ]
w
7
u
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ NA] [ i [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA BECAUSE ONE UNIT IS IN INACTIVE STANDBY.
NASA HAS UPGRADED THIS TYPE OF FAILURE MODE FROM 3/2R TO 2/IR ON
PREMISE THAT LOSS OF BOTH PCMMUs COULD CAUSE LOSS OF FAULT
DETECTION PARAMETERS THAT COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
AGREE WITH NASA CRIT. NOTE: PRESENT FLIGHT RULES CALL FOR
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT ON LOSS OF FIRST PCMMU.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-123
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
123
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
CP]
CP]
C ]
B
[p]
[ NA]
CN]
C
[P]
[p]
[ ]
ClL
ITEM
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ NA] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS".
SCREEN B SHOULD BE NA BECAUSE ONE UNIT IS IN INACTIVE STANDBY.
NASA HAS UPGRADED THIS TYPE OF FAILURE MODE FROM 3/2R TO 2/1R ON
PREMISE THAT LOSS OF BOTH PCMMUs COULD CAUSE LOSS OF FAULT
DETECTION PARAMETERS THAT COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE SAFETY.
AGREE WITH NASACRIT. NOTE_ _ PRESENT FLIGHT RULES CALL FOR
MINIMUM DURATION FLIGHT ON LOSS OF FIRST P_.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-124
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
• NEW [ X]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
124
PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
IX] *
IX]
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-125
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220402-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
125
PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
I
mm
mm
m
m
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B
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-126
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
126
PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENSCRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] C ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
m
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-127
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220401-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
COMPONENTS (3)
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
127
PCM POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, CRITICALITY 3
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /2R ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[P] [P] [P]
[P] [P] [P]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
REMARKS:
AGREE WITH NASA FMEA CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSH_
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-128
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-220402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
128
SWITCH TOGGLE, 3P3T (i)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LATEST NASA FEMA ASSIGNS CRIT 2/IR ON PREMISE SUBSEQUENT FAILURE
IN A CRITICAL SUBSYSTEM COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE, BECAUSE
PCMMU_D_S _I DATA/ AND_ITICAL SUBSYSTEM FAILURES COULD BE
CANCELED. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-131
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-321200-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
131
MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 2 /IR ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ P ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ]
[N] [N]
C
[ F ]
[ ]
[ N ]
CIL
ITEM
[X]*
ix]
[ ]
m
l
mm
m
m
m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY OF OPINION WITHIN
NASA ON MTU CRIT. THESE ARE SPF's THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MTU
FUNCTION. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE LOSS OF MTU PREVENTS BFS
OPS AND MTU FAILS SCREEN C BECAUSE OF SPF's.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-132
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-321200-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
132
MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY OF OPINION WITHIN
NASA ON MTU CRIT. THESE ARE SPF's THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MTU
FUNCTION. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA BECAUSE LOSS OF MTU PREVENTS BFS
OPS AND MTU FAILS SCREEN C BECAUSE OF SPF's.
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-133
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-321200-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
133
MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ F ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
[ X] *
IX]
I
I
z
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m
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
INVESTIGATIONS CONTINUE TO RECONCILE DIVERSITY OF OPINION WITHIN
NASA ON _ ¢RI3_ THE_E _ SPF's _T COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MTU
FUNCTION. AGREE WITH NASA _EA BECAUSE LOSS OF _ PREVENTS BFS
OPS AND _ FAILS SCREEN C BECAUSE OF SPF's.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-134
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221201-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
_w [ ]
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
134
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, MTU (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ 3 /1R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NASA FMEA 05-6R-221201-I, PRE-51L BASELINE, ASSIGNS CRIT 3/IR,
BUT WRITE-UP DOES NOT SUPPORT THAT CRIT ("LOSS OF MTU WILL NOT
AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE" AND "POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION"). RECOMMEND
CRIT 3/2R.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
INSTR-141
05-4-221400-1
INSTRUMENTATION
141
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)
A. W. ADDIS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
C ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
I
i
g
J
l
L
g
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-142
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221400-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
142
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
J
L_
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [
INADEQUATE [
E
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
INSTR-143
05-4-221400-2
INSTRUMENTATION
143
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)
A. W. ADDIS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
B C
C ] C ] [ ] *
[ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ I ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
g
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-144X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221401-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION
144
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5-AMP, PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUND_CY _S_EENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-151
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221500-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
151
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
g
m
mm
M
i
B
D
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID:
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
INSTR-152
05-4-221500-2
INSTRUMENTATION
152
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)
A. W. ADDIS
RE'DUND_CY SCREENS .........
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [
B C
] C ]
] C ]
] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-153
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221500-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
153
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
M
I
g
i
mm
i
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-154X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221501-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION
154
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5-AMP, PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDiS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [
COMPARE C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]. [ ]
- _ _ _ (ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [, ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
L_
w
F
m
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-161
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221300-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
161
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
[ X] *
[ ]
[ N ]
D
l
I
I
m
l
U
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT CONSIDERED AVAILABILITY OF SPARE PDI CARRIED ON FLIGHTS
FOR WHICH PDI IS MISSION CRITICAL, BUT PDI SUBSTITUTION REQUIRES
OFF-NOMINAL CREW ACTIVITY. AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.
mm
mm
mm
m
l
m
mm
g
l
B
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-42 E
I
z
I
ww
1
W
1
= =
=
1
1
w ,
E
n
W
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-162
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221300-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
INSTRUMENTATION
162
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT-.
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ NA] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS-.
IOA CRIT CONSIDERED AVAILABILITY OF SPARE PDI CARRIED ON FLIGHTS
FOR WHICH PDI IS MISSION CRITICAL, BUT PDI SUBSTITUTION REQUIRES
OFF-NOMINAL CREW ACTIVITY. AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.
W
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-163
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221300-2
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ X ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
163
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ ] [ ] ix]
[ P ] [ NA] [ P ]
IN] IN] IN]
[ x ] *
[ ]
[N]
m
m
m
I
mm
D
D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA CRIT CONSIDERED AVAILABILITY OF SPARE PDI CARRIED ON FLIGHTS
FOR WHICH PDI IS MISSION CRITICAL, BUT PDI SUBSTITUTION REQUIRES
OFF-NOMINAL CREW ACTIVITY. AGREE WITH NASA CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE:l/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-164
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221301-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEw [ ]
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
164
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, PDI (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
V3 ]
]
/N ]
12R ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B
[ ] [ ]
[P] [P]
[N] [N]
C
[ ]
[ P ]
[N]
(If different from NASA)
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
_ION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
CIRCUIT IS REDUNDANT. LOSS OF POWER TO PDI AND
T LOSS OF PDI FUNCTION COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
:S.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENTDATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-171
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
171
SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER OPS l&2
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCE IN CRIT ASSIGNMENT. THE SCREENS SHOULD NOT BE
RATED FOR A 3/3 CRITICALITY.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
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ASSESS_NT DATE: 1/28/8V
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-172
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221001-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
OPS 2 STRS
INSTRUMENTATION
172
SWITCH MODE RECORD/STANDBY/PLAYBACK FOR OPS 1 &
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] C
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[ /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-173
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221003-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
173
SWITCH MODE, OPS 1 & 2 ANOMALY START/OFF/ERASE
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different fromNASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ( ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA SHOULD HAVE ASSIGNED 3/3 CRITICALITY. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-174
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221002-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
174
SWITCH, MODE LOOP/MAINT OPS 1 & 2 STRS
LEAD ANALYST : B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
C 3/3 ] C ] C ] C ]
C / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ]*
[ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA SHOULD HAVE ASSIGNED 3/3 CRITICALITY. AGREE WITH NASA FMEA.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-175X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
175
EVENT INDICATOR - OPS RECORDER CONTROL MODE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
I
mm
I
I
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (if applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-176
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
176
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, OPS RCDR I, (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY. THE SCREEN SHOULD NOT BE RATED FOR
3/3 CRIT.
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-176X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
176
EVENT INDICATOR, OPS RECORDER OPERATIONAL MODE
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ]" [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C ............
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-177
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
177
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, OPS RCDR 2, (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY ..... REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCE IN CRITICALITY. THE SCREENS SHOULD NOT BE RATED
FOR 3/3 CRIT.
i
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-177X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221004-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
177
EVENT INDICATOR - ANOMALY SEQUENCE TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
I
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l
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-181
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
181
SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER-PAYLOAD
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
C ] C ]
CP] CP]
CN] CN]
[ ]
[P]
IN]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS :
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO ROUTE PAYLOAD DATA TO GROUND, EITHER
VIA PLAYBACK OR REAL-TIME, COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION _
OBJECTIVES.
u
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-182
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221103-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
182
SWITCH, ROTARY P/L STR MODE SELECT
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] [ ] [ ]
CP] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2 R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PAYLOAD RECORDER MODE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-183
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221101-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
183
SWITCH, OPERATE/ERASE-PAYLOAD STR
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT".
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ /N ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] C ]
[ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO SELECT OPERATE/ERASE FUNCTION COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-184
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221102-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
184
SWITCH, ROTARY P/L STR SPEED CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
u
U
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
LOSS OF ALL CAPABILITY TO CONTROL PAYLOAD RECORDER SPEED COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION OBJECTIVES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID; EPDC/INSTR-185
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-221101-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
185
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT PAYLOAD RECORDER (2)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P j [ P ] '[ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA DOES NOT CONCUR WITH NASA's EVALUATION. LOSS OF PAYLOAD DATA
WILL NOT AFFECT CREW OR VEHICLE. BUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION
OBJECTIVES IN SPECIFIC CASES.
z :
w
=
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-!85X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221104-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
SOURCE
INSTRUMENTATION
185
EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
g
mm
u
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i
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I
z
m
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I
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/26/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-186X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-221104-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
186
EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER MODE TALKBACK
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
C ]
w
w
w
W
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-201
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220300-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/nmC
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
INSTRUMENTATION
201
WIDE-BAND SIGNAL CONDITIONER (WBSC)
A. W. ADDIS
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
B
g
L
I
u
mm
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] C ]
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
g
z
I
J
I
m
i
I
I
m
i
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-202
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION _,
202
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT WBSC EQUIPMENT (I)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
C ] *
C ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
w
w
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-203
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
203
POWER DISTRIBUTION ASSEMBLY
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
J
I
D
g
m
m
glum
D
m
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R
u
u
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-211
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
211
WIDE BAND ACIP PCM SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA
IOA
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
[3/3 ] [ ] [ ] [
[ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES IN CRITICALITY ASSIGNMENT.
C ]
C ]
w
Lw
%--
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESS_NT ID: INSTR-212
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
212
STRAIN GAGE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS (SGSC'S)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
g
U
I
g
I
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
[ ]
[ ]
J
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-213
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238502-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
INSTRUMENTATION
213
MADS STRAIN GAGE CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
.... INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
W
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-214
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238502-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
214
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT SG/PCM (i)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
[ ]
[ ]
w
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ASSESS_MEI_WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-218
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220700-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 218
ITEM: FASCOS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] [ ] ,
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
w
=
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-221
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220600-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
INSTRUMENTATION
221
FREQUENCY DIVISION MULTIPLEXER
A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
C ]
C ]
[ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
m
l
l
m
I
b
RECOMMENDATIONS:
[" /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
g
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ASSES_$MENT WORKSH
Z
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTRr2_2
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230601-1, -230602-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUM__NTATION .....
MDAC ID: 222
ITEM: FDM CALIBRATION CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS --
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDWlFUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
.... D D cY_ SCREENS
A B C
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] C _ ] C ]
[ ] C_] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If d_fferent from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
i ]
(ADD/DELETE)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
u
w
F
w
w
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-231
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 231
ITEM: PCM MUX
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] C ] C ] [ ] *
] C ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
l
g
_mm
mm
I
I
B
g
B
D
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
z
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-232
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230401-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
INSTRUMENTATION
232
PCMMODE CONTROL SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE C / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-233
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230402-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
233
PCM RECORD MODE SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/_JNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
C ]
[ ]
W
I
b
I
l
D
iw
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i
D
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-241
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-238000-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATIoN-
241
MADS CONTROL MODULE (MCM)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] C ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
[ ]
[ ]
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-242
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-238001-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
242
POWER & CONTROL CIRCUIT, MCM (i)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ]
COMPARE [ / ]
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
[ ]
C ]
[ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
w
is
D
m
mm
I
RECOMMENDATIONS :
i /
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
M
l
U
g
I
mm
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: _C/INSTR-243
NASA FMEA #: 0S-6R-230601-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
243
CIRCUIT, ET POWER DISTRIBUTION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA C 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
m
E
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-251
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230800-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
251
MADS RECORDER
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] C ]
] [ ]
m
,,m
mm
mm
mm
mm
i
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
[ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-252
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230800-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
252
MADS RECORDER
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUND_CY-S_REENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
=
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-79
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-253
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230800-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
253
MADS RECORDER
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
[
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] [ ]
mm
mm
g
ms
I
m
M
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
mm
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-254
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230802-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
INSTRUMENTATION
254
MADS RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
u
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If-applicable)
REMARKS. -
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
u
L_
D
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-255
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230802-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
255
MADS RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
mm
m
mm
g
I
m
mm
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] C ] C [ ]
"(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
mm
i
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-256
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-230801-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
256
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, MADS RCDR (i)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
[ ] [ ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] ,
[ ]
[ ]
l
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
[ ]
[ ]
w
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-261
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230500-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
261
REFERENCE JUNCTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
C
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] .
] [ ]
] C ]
i
mm
mm
m
b
mR
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
mm
I
mm
mm
I
I
I
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-262
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-230500-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
262
REFERENCE JUNCTIONS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ]
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
w
w
w
few
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-85
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-263
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236100-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
263
STRAIN GAGE TRANSDUCER
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / 3 [ 3
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
C ]
C ]
m
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-264
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-22400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
264
ACCELEROMETER
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-87
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-265
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-232200-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
265
ACCELEROMETER
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
I
I
M
i
g
U
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-266
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-237300-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
266
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
w
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-267
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236700-1
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
267
RADIOMETER
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B
C ]
[ ]
[ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
C
[
CIL
ITEM
] [ ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
mm
mm
mm
=_
g
g
M
I
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-268
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236400-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
268
THERMOCOUPLE, FUSELAGE TPS
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [
] C ] *
] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] C ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-91
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-269
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236300-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
269
THERMOCOUPLE, LEFT WING ELEVON
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA C 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.,
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-270
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-236200-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW C ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
270
TEMPERATURE SENSORS
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] C ] C ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] C ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (Ifdifferent from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
u
w
w
m
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-271
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
271
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (i)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
C
C
[
[
CIL
ITEM
] C ] *
] [ ]
] [ ]
h
im
I
I
g
I
I
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
l
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-272
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213501-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
272
FUSE, FPCA MN BUS A IA (i)
T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC
REDUNDANCY SCREENS
A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ]
B C
C ] C ]
C ] C ]
C ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS :
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
i
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-273
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213500-I
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
273
FUSE, FPCA, MN BUS A IA (I)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
B
D
r
m
z
l
u
l
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
C ]
C ]
m
l
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I
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g
U
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-274
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213400-I
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
274
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (i)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY RED_D_CY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C ] C ] C ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
COMPARE [ / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] C ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
_ _' ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-97
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/28/87
ASSESSMENT ID: EPDC/INSTR-275
NASA FMEA #: 05-6R-213401-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
275
FUSE, FPCA-2, MN B, IA (I)
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [
COMPARE [ / ] [
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
B C
] [ ] [ ] C ] *
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE
INADEQUATE
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
[ ]
[ ]
I
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ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-301X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220500-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
301
VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
CIL
ITEM
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [
] *
]
COMPARE [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] C ] [ ] C ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE:
REMARKS:
NO DIFFERENCES.
(If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
n
m
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ASSESSMENTWORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-302X
NASA FMEA #: 05-4-220202-1
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
302
DSCs OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT".
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE C /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
B
u
mm
I
I
m
l
m
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
C / ] [ ] C ] [ ] C ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 107 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 107 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-302X. NO DIFFERENCES.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-303X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 303
ITEM: DSC OF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 3 /2R ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
C ] C ] [ ]
[p] [P] [P]
[ N ] [ N ] [ N ]
[ ] *
[ ]
[ ]
m
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 108 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 108 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-303X. DSC OF3 HANDLES MEASUREMENTS
OF ARPCS DP/DT AND CABIN PARTIAL PRESSURE, OXYGEN. LOSS OF ALL
MEANS OF DETECTION OF CABIN PRESSURE LOSS WOULD CAUSE
MISSION TERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-101
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-304X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 304
ITEM: DSC OF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /2R ] [ P ] [ P ] [ P ] [ ]
(ADD/DE LETE )
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 109 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 109 AND IS
BEING RESTORE_D AS IOA INSTRr30_. DSCOF3 _DLES MEAS_MENTS
OF ARPCS DP/DT AND CABIN PARTIAL PRESSURE, OXYGEN. ERRONEOUS
MEASUREMENTS AND LOSS OF UNLIKE REDUNDANCY FOR MONITORING
CABIN PRESSURE COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID;o
NASA FMEA #:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
LEAD ANALYST:
ASSESSMENT:
INSTR-305X
05-5-B03-7-I
NASA [ 2 /2 ]
IOA [ 3 /IR ]
COMPARE [ N /N ]
INSTRUMENTATION
305
MDM OF4, OAI, OA2, OA3
A.W. ADDIS
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ X ]
NEW [ ]
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL
FLIGHT ITEM
HDW/FUNC A B C
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ P ] [ F ] [ P ]
[ ] [ ] [ ]
[ x] *
IX]
[ ]
n
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ 3 /IR ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ X ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA iii WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C iii AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-305X. THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE
CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA. ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A
HEATER STUCK ON COULD PROMPT MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU,
REQURING ABORT. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNEL COULD
NOT BE DETECTED. NOTE: NASA FMEA WRITEUP IS INCONSISTENT WITH
2/2 CRIT AND ASSIGNS SCREENS FOR THAT 2/2 CRIT.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I03
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-306X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 306
ITEM: MDM OF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 116 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 116 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-306X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS , MDM
OF3 _D-I_S CRITICAL FUEL CELL _ASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 306X). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS
WOULD REQUIRE MISSION TERMINATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-307X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 307
ITEM: MDM OF3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA [ / ]
IOA [ 2 /2 ]
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] C ] C ]
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [ ] ....
NEW [ ]
C
[ ]
[ ]
[ ]
CIL
ITEM
[ ] *
IX]
[N]
m
t
RECOMMENDATIONS ."
[2/2
(If different from NASA)
] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ A ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
....... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 117 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 117 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS IOA INSTR-307X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS, MDM
OF3 HANDLES CRITICAL FUEL CELL MEASUREMENTS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO
REDUNDANT PATH (SE IOA 307X). ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTS
COULD CAUSE IMPROPER MANUAL SHUTDOWN OF A FUEL CELL, REQUIRING
UNNECESSARY MISSION TERMINATION.
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 C-I05
APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-308X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
308
MDM OF1, OF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
mm
L
mm
mm
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CILRETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 118 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 118 AND IS
BEING _STORED AS INSTR-308X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM
MDM's OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE
MEASUREMENTS (SEE IOA 308). LOSS OF THESE MEASUREMENTS WOULD
CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
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ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-309X
NASA FMEA #: NONE
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
309
MDM OF1, OF2
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B C
NASA [ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ N ]
w
w
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[2/2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [A]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 119 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 119 AND IS
BEING RESTORED AS INSTR-309X. FOR PRESENT FUEL CELLS SYSTEM MDMs
OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS
(SEE IOA 309). ERRONEOUS MDM OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE
INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION AND COULD PROMPT A MANUAL
FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN THAT COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS.
w
w
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APPENDIX C
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/29/88
ASSESSMENT ID: INSTR-310X
NASA FMEA #: 05-5-B03-7-2
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
INSTRUMENTATION
310
MDM OAI, OA2, OA3
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS
ASSESSMENT:
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS
FLIGHT
HDW/FUNC A B
NASA DATA:
BASELINE [
NEW [
CIL
ITEM
C
NASA [ 2 /2 ] [ P ] [ F ] [ P ] [ X ] *
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ X ]
COMPARE [ / ] [ N ] [ N ] [ N ] [ ]
B
|
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RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA)
[ / ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
(ADD/DELETE)
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable)
ADEQUATE [ ]
..... INADEQUATE [ ]
REMARKS:
IOA 120 WAS INADVERTENTLY OVERWRITTEN BY IOA EPD&C 120 AND IS
BEING_STO_D-ASINSTR£31oX_CRITICAL APu FuEL LINE SYSTEM
TEMPERATURES ARE HANDLED BY THESE MDM's. THEIR LOSS WOULD CAUSE
MISSION TERMINATION. THE NASA FMEA WORDING IS INCONSISTENT
WITH ASSIGNED CRITICALITY, AND SCREENS SHOULD NOT BE RATED FOR A
2/2 CRITICALITY.
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APPENDIX D
_-{
CRITICAL ITEMS
m
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D-I
NASA FMEA
I,I----IIIO_I IIII
05-5-B03-7-I
05-5-B03-7-I
05-6R-221501-I
05-6R-221504-I
05-4-220400-1
05-4-220400-2
05-4-220400-2
05-4-220402-1
05-6R-220402-I
05-4-321200-1
05-4-321200-2
05-4-321200-2
05-4-221300-1
05-4-221300-1
05-4-221300-2
05-5-B03-7-I
NONE
NONE
NONE
NONE
05-5-B03-7-2
MDAC-ID
104
113
115
117
118
121
122
123
124
128
131
132
133
161
162
163
3O5
306
307
308
309
310
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
FLIGHT ITEM
IIIiiI iIiii
3/IR
3/IR
2/IR
3/3
3/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/1R
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
2/2
DSC OAI, OA2,
OA3, OMI
MDM OF4, OAI,
OA2, OA3
MDM OAI, OA2, OA3
PWR & CNTRL CIRCUIT
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2T
PULSE CODE MODULATION
PULSE CODE MODULATION
PULSE CODE MODULATION
PCMMU FORMAT CNTRL SW
SWITCH TOGGLE, 3P3T (i)
MASTER TIMING UNIT
MASTER TIMING UNIT
MASTER TIMING UNIT
PL DATA INTERLEAVER
PL DATA INTERLEAVER
PL DATA INTERLEAVER
MDM OF4, OAI, OA2, OA3
MDM OF3
MDM OF3
MDM OF1, OF2
MDM OF1, OF2
MDM OAI, OA2, OA3
FAILURE MODE
mm
im
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
i
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
OPEN, SHORTED
I
FAILS TO CLOSE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRATIC OPERATIO_
INTERMITTENT
OPERATION
PHYSICAL BINDING/
JAMMING I
FAILS TO CLOSE
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRATIC OPERATION _
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRATIC OPERATIOh
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT =
LOSS OF OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LOSS OF OUTPUT
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APPENDIX E
DETAILED _%IfALYS I S
This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksheets supplementing
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA86001-
017, Analysis of the Instrumentation Subsystem (12 December
1986). Prior results were obtained independently and documented
before starting the FMEA/CIL assessment activity. Supplemental
analysis was performed to address failure modes not previously
considered by the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item
being analyzed, parent assembly and function performed. For each
failure mode possible causes are identified, and hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase are determined as
described in NSTS 22206. Instructions for Preparation of FMEA and
CIL, I0 October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the
bottom of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at
the top.
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 I Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA I Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P _ Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
E-I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/26/88
EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION
144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5-AMP, PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STANDARD SWITCH PANEL
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER. LOSS OF BUFFER FUNCTION BECAUSE OF
CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-750139 m
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSI_WORKSHEET
1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITIL_LITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C/INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
154 ABORT: 3/3
L ...........
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5-AMP, PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
ORBITAL TIMING BUFFER
CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH : 3/ 3 RTLS :
LI FTOFF : 3/ 3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ]
. T
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL 016
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES : CONTAMINATION, CHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE , VIBI_VfION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER PROVIDES POWER AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE
ORBITAL TIMING BUFFER. LOSS OF BUFFER FUNCTION BECAUSE OF
CIRCUIT BREAKER FAILURE WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-750139
w
w
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYST_: INSTR_NTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 175 ABORT: 3/3
ITS: EVENT INDICATOR - OPS _CORDER CONTROL MODE
FAIL_ MODE: E_TIC OPE_TION, PHYSICAL BINDING/J_ING,
E_ONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ET._CTRICAL), FAI_ TO SWITCH, SHORTED
_AD _ALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS _AD: K. SC_CKPEPER
BREAK_ HIE_CHY:
I) INSTR_NTATION
2) oI
3) OPS _CORDER
4) CONTROL MODE TA_BACK
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_D_G/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_CATION: P_EL A1
P_T _BER: MC452-0222-OXXX
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MIS_DLING/ABUSE, PIECE-P_T FAIL_E,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
TA_BACK INDICATES _ETHER OPs RECORDER IS IN CO_D OR P_EL
CONTROL MODE. _SS OF INDICATION WOU_ NOT BE CRITICAL TO
MISSION OR TO C_W/_HIC_.
b
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_FE_NCES: SYSTEM SCHE_TIC VS70-750119 1
i
_RT DATE 02/18/88 E-4
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 176 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR, OPS RECORDER OPERATIONAL MODE
FAILURE MODE: :_ ERRATIC OPERATION_PHYSICAL BiNDiNG/JAMMING,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OI
OPS RECORDER
OPERATIONAL MODE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL Al
MC452-0222-0XXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MIS_DLiNG/ABUSE, PIECE'PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACK INDICATES WHETHER OPs RECORDER IS IN RECORD MODE;
STANDBY, STOP, OR UNPOWERED; OR IN PLAYBACK OR REWIND. LOSS OF
INDICATION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
m REFERENCES: VS70-750119
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-5
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 177 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR - ANOMALY SEQUENCE TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OI
OPS RECORDER
ANOMALY SEQUENCE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
MC452-0222-OXXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACK IS INTENDED TO INDICATE WHETHER OPS RECORDER IS IN
ANOMALY SEQUENCE OR NOT. LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL
TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-750119
I
m
g
Ill
I
m
I
U
I
I
im
_=
I
I
I
I
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-6
m
I
i
J
mi
u
i
_ I
n
H
m
__=-
L _
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 185 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER CONTROL SOURCE
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
S)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OI
PAYLOAD RECORDER
RECORDER CONTROL SOURCE TALKBACK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A1
MC452-0222-0XXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE'PARTFAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACK INDICATES WHETHER PAYLOAD RECORDER IS UNDER PANEL OR MDM
CONTROL. LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-750149
w
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 1/26/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F_C
SUBSYSTEM: INSTR_NTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 186 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR - PAYLOAD RECORDER MODE TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
T._AD _ALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAK_ HIE_CHY :
1 ) INSTR_NTATION
2) OI
3 ) PAYLOAD RECORDER
4) RECORDER OPERATIONAL MODE TALKBACK
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
P_UNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/_NC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
c [ ]
LOCATION: P_EL A1
PART _BER: MC452-0222-0X_
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFE_S/RATIONAt_:
TA_BACK INDICATES OPERATIONAL MODE OF THE PAYLOAD RECORDER -
_CORD MODE; ST_DBY, STOP, OR _POWE_D; OR IN P_YBACK OR
_WIND. LOSS OF _CTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO
CREW/VEHICLE.
_FE_NCES: VS70-750149
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/88
INSTRUMENTATION
301
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
_)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VARIOUS LOCATIONS
MC476-0205-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE VIBRATION MONITORING SYSTEMIS USED TO CONDITION TRANSDUCER
SIGNALS ROUTED TO MDM's FOR FURTHER PROCESSING. LOSS OF FUNCTION
WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO MISSION OR TO CREW/VEHICLE.
m
REFERENCES: VS70-750209
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/27/88
INSTR_NTATION
302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAIL--MODE:
DSCs OAI, OA2, OA3, OMI
_SS OF O_P_
TRAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS _D: K. SC_CKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
i) INSTR_ATION
2) oi
3) DSC
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3-
_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
HDW/FUNC
3/2R,,
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
C [ P ]
_CATION: OAI AV BAY 4, OA2 AV BAY 5, OA3 AV BAY 6, OMI MID
_SE_GE
PART _BER: MC476-0131
CAUSES_ T_PE__, VI_T_ON'::C_INATION,:_C_ICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
THESE DSCs SUPPLY A VOLTAGE (5 VOLTS DC) TO FLIGHT CRITICAL MDMS
FFI, FF3, FF4 VIA THE AUTO/_ ET SEP SWITCH FOR ET SEP_TION;
AND TO THE S_E MDMs VIA THE AUTO-_/AUTO _B SEP SWITCH FOR SRB
SEP_TION. _SS OF A_ SO_CES FOR T_T VOLTAGE AND
ALL SEPARATION COMMAND CAPABILITY (KEYBOARD AND GROUND) WOULD BE
CATASTROPHIC.
_FE_NCES: SCHE_TIC VS70-760502 (ET & SRB SEP SW CKT), SSSH OI
DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, IPCL, FSSR STS 83-0010A (T._VEL C GNC _),
INCO/CO_ OI BRIEF SB48, STS 83-0026A 4.2.2, 4.2.3
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-10
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
2/02/87
INSTRUMENTATION
303
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
DSC OF3
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3 ) DSC
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 3
PART NUMBER: MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF INPUT,
MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE •
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CRITICAL AIR REVITALIZATION PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM TELEMETRY
DATA IS PROCESSED BY DSC OF3 (CABIN DP/DT AND PARTIAL PRESSURE,
OXYGEN). THE DP/DT MEASUREMENT IS USED BY C&W FOR KLAXON INPUT.
NO REDUNDANT DSC PATH IS PROVIDED. LOSS OF MEASUREMENTS
COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION BECAUSE POTENTIALLY CATASTROPHIC
FAILURES COULD BE CONCEALED.
REFERENCES: SSSH PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM 6.1, IPCL, SSSH OI
DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/23/87
INSTRUMENTATION
304
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DSC OF3
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD,ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
mm
l
m
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: m
I) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) DSC
4) m
S)
6).
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AV BAY3
PART NUMBER: MC476-0131
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CRITICAL AIR REVITALIZATION PRESSURE CONTROL SYSTEM TELEMETRY
DATA IS PROCESSED BY DSC OF3 (CABIN DP/DT AND PARTIAL PRESSURE,
OXYGEN). THE DP/DT MEASUREMENT IS USED BY C&W FOR KLAXON INPUT.
NO REDUNDANT PATH IS PROVIDED. ERRONEOUS MEASUREMENTS
COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
1/23/87
INSTRUMENTATION
305
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM OF4, OA1, OA2, OA3
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) MDM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
....CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OF4 FLT DECK, OAI AV BAY 4, OA2 AV BAY 5, OA3 AV
BAY 6
PART NUMBER: MC615-O04-53XX, 6310
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE MDM's PROCESS/ROUTE CRITICAL APU STATUS DATA (FUEL TEST
LINE TEMPERATURE AND FUEL PUMP DRAIN LINE TEMPERATURE). AN
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT FALSELY INDICATING A HEATER STUCK IN "ON"
CONDITION COULD PROMPT _AL SHUTDOWN OF AN APU. TWO OF THE
THREE APU's ARE REQURIED FOR LANDING; THEREFORE SHUTDOWN OF ONE
WOULD REQUIRE ABORT DURING LIFTOFF. AN ERRONEOUS OUTPUT MASKING
A HEATER STUCK ON COULD RESULT IN EXPLOSION AND CAUSE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. FAILS SCREEN B BECAUSE FAILED MDM CHANNEL
COULD NOT BE DETECTED.
REFERENCES: SSSH Oi DSC/MDM DWG. 17.1, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF SB28,
IPCL, VS70-946099
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-13
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 1/15/87
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 306
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: MDM OF3
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
mm
z
mm
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: ..
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3 ) MDM
4) "
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
AV BAY 3
MC615-0004-53XX, 6310
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDM OF3 HANDLES ALL FUEL CELL
CURRENT MEASUREMENTS AND FCI SUBSTACK 3, FC2 SUBSTACK 2, AND FC3
SUBSTACK 1 DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS. THESE MEARUREMENTS ARE
CRITICAL BECAUSE THEIR _ss COUp_CONTROL OXYGEN-HYDROGEN _ _:_
CROSSOVER IN A FUEL CELL WHICH IN TURN COULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION
AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW IF THE MALFUNCTIONING FUEL CELL WERE
NOT SHUT DOWN PROMPTLY. (PRIMARY METHOD OF DETECTING FUEL CELL
"HOT'SPOTS ", AND THEREFORE EXPLOSION_ZARD, IS IF
A DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENT RISES RAPIDLY AND GOES OUT OF NORMAL
RANGE - ABOVE 150 MV.) NO REDUNDANT PATHS EXIST FOR THESE
MEASUREMENTS. THEIR LOSS WOULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION.
REFERENCES: SSSH FUEL CELL 3.4, IPCL, SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1,
INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48, SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E, EPS INT SCHEMATICS
VS70-945099, VS70"945102
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-14
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/e7
INSTRUMENTATION
307
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM OF3
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, PREMATURE OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3 ) MDM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: _ 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AV BAY 3
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-53XX, 6310
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDM OF3 HANDLES ALL FUEL CELL
CURRENT MEASUREMENTS AND DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS FOR FCI
SUBSTACK 3, FC2 SUBSTACK 2, AND FC3 SUBSTACK i. AN ERRONEOUS OR
PREMATURE OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE INDICATION OF FUEL CELL
MALFUNCTION, E.G., A SUDDEN INCREASE IN INDICATED SUBSTACK DELTA
VOLTAGE OR CURRENT IMBALANCE AMONG FUEL CELLS. SUCH AN APPARENT
MALFUNCTION COULD PROMPT MANUAL FUEL CELL SHUTDOWN WHICH IN TURN
COULD REQUIRE MISSION CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD CAUSE
MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: SSSH FUEL CELL 3.4, IPCL, SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1,
INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48, SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E, EPS INT SCHEMATICS
VS70-945099, VS70-945102
REPORT DATE 02/18/88. E-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT"
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87
INSTRUMENTATION
308
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM OF1, OF2
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) MDM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MDM OF1 AV BAY I, MDM OF2 AV BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-53XX, 6310
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDMs OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE FUEL CELL
SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS. EACH OF THESE MEASUREMENTS
IS CRITICAL AND ITS LOSS COULD CAUSE MISSION TERMINATION BECAUSE
THAT LOSS COULD CONCEAL OXYGEN-HYDROGEN CROSSOVER IN A
FUDL CELL WHICH IN TURN COULD CAUSE AN EXPLOSION AND LOSS OF
VEHICLE AND CREW IF THE MALFUNCTIONING FUEL CELL WERE NOT SHUT
DOWN PROMPTLY. NO REDUNDANT PATHS EXIST FOR THESE MEASUREMENTS.
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REFERENCES: SSSH FUEL CELL 3.4, IPCL, SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1,
INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48, SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E, EPS INT SCHEMATICS
VS70-945099, VS70-954102
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
1/15/87
INSTRUMENTATION
309
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM OF1, OF2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) INSTRUMENTATION
2) oI
3 ) MDM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MDM OF1 AV BAY I, MDM OF2 AV BAY 2
MC615-0004-53XX, 6310
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FOR PRESENT FUEL CELL SYSTEM MDMs OF1 AND OF2 HANDLE FUEL CELL
SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE MEASUREMENTS. AN ERRONEOUS OR PREMATURE
OUTPUT COULD CAUSE A FALSE INDICATION OF FUEL CELL MALFUNCTION,
E.G., A SUDDEN INCREASE IN ANY SUBSTACK DELTA VOLTAGE AMONG
FUEL CELLS. SUCH AN APPARENT MALFUNCTION COULD PROMPT MANUAL
FUEL CELL SHUT DOWN WHICH IN TURN COULD REQUIRE MISSION
CONSTRAINTS THAT WOULD RESULT IN MISSION LOSS.
REFERENCES: SSSH FUEL CELL 3.4, IPCL SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1,
INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB48, SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E, EPS INT SCHEMATICS
VS70-945099, VS70-954102
REPORT DATE 02/18/88 E-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
1/21/87
INSTRUMENTATION
310
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM OAI, OA2, OA3
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1 ) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3 ) MDM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MDM OA1 AV BAY 4, MDM OA2 AV BAY 5, MDM OA3 AV BAY
6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-53XX, 6410
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS OF FUEL LINE TEMPATURE, FUEL PUMP
OUTPUT TEMPATURE, AND BYPASS LINE TEMPERATURE FOR THE THREE APUs
ARE PROCESSED BY MDMs OAI, OA2, AND OA3. REDUNDANT PAIRS OF
MEASUREMENTS ARE NOT ROUTED VIA SEPARATE MDM PATHS FOR THESE
MEASUREMENTS, THEIR LOSS WOUL[YCAUSELOSS OF INSIGHT INTO APU
OPERATION, WHICH COULD CAUSE MISSION ABORT, OR COULD CONCEAL
MALFUNCTIONS THAT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17'1, INCO/COMM OI BRIEF SB28,
INSTRUMENTATION PROGRAM AND COMPONENT LIST (IPCL)
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APPENDIX F
NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENDATIONS
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA FMEA and
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E.
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA
recommendations.
7
Appendix F Legend
Code Definition
1 IOA recommends changing the second failure mode
described in the effects field.
2 IOA recommends deleting the IOA failure mode.
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